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ABSTRACT
Background Policy makers need to be rapidly informed 
about the potential equity consequences of different 
COVID-19 strategies, alongside their broader health and 
economic impacts. While there are complex models to 
inform both potential health and macro- economic impact, 
there are few tools available to rapidly assess potential 
equity impacts of interventions.
Methods We created an economic model to simulate the 
impact of lockdown measures in Pakistan, Georgia, Chile, 
UK, the Philippines and South Africa. We consider impact 
of lockdown in terms of ability to socially distance, and 
income loss during lockdown, and tested the impact of 
assumptions on social protection coverage in a scenario 
analysis.
Results In all examined countries, socioeconomic status 
(SES) quintiles 1–3 were disproportionately more likely to 
experience income loss (70% of people) and inability to 
socially distance (68% of people) than higher SES quintiles. 
Improving social protection increased the percentage 
of the workforce able to socially distance from 48% 
(33%–60%) to 66% (44%–71%). We estimate the cost of 
this social protection would be equivalent to an average of 
0.6% gross domestic product (0.1% Pakistan–1.1% Chile).
Conclusions We illustrate the potential for using publicly 
available data to rapidly assess the equity implications 
of social protection and non- pharmaceutical intervention 
policy. Social protection is likely to mitigate inequitable 
health and economic impacts of lockdown. Although 
social protection is usually targeted to the poorest, middle 
quintiles will likely also need support as they are most 
likely to suffer income losses and are disproportionately 
more exposed.
INTRODUCTION
In the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
many countries around the world adopted 
stringent non- pharmaceutical interventions 
(NPIs) to slow the spread of SARS- CoV-2 and 
avoid exceeding hospital bed capacity.1 These 
interventions included a variety of containment 
and closure policies including school closures, 
curfews and other restrictions in movement, 
business closures and requirements to work 
from home, and are sometimes broadly termed 
termed ‘lockdown’.2 3–6 These policies were 
designed to mitigate the spread of infection with 
SARS- CoV-2 and reduce the burden of COVID-19 
on the health system, and were particularly 
effective in areas where they were implemented 
before widespread transmission.7 8 However, the 
magnitude of the social and economic impacts 
of lockdown policies has given rise to heated 
debates surrounding the net benefit of further 
restrictions.9 As the pandemic continues and 
until vaccines can be widely implemented, there 
is an ongoing need for difficult policy decisions 
on further NPIs.
Key questions
What is already known?
 ► The COVID-19 pandemic is exacerbating existing 
structural inequalities around the world.
 ► There are few tools available to rapidly assess po-
tential equity impacts and social protection needs 
when evaluating policy options, especially where 
household- level data are lacking.
What are the new findings?
 ► We find the overall numbers of people losing in-
come and/or unable to socially distance in the ab-
sence of social protection were likely to be high in 
all countries.
 ► People in lower socioeconomic status quintiles were 
consistently more likely to have been exposed to 
greater health and/or economic risk during lock-
down across all countries studied.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Equity impacts of interventions can be evaluated 
alongside their macro- economic and epidemiologi-
cal impact using publicly available data.
 ► Use of this model can inform further decisions on 
non- pharmaceutical interventions and help to iden-
tify populations in need of social protection.
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Lessons from other pandemics inform us that the 
economic impacts of pandemics can be pernicious and 
long- lasting, and that equity must be a key consideration in 
considering policy response.10–13 The COVID-19 pandemic 
has brought the socioeconomic determinants, and conse-
quences, of health into sharp relief.14 Disadvantaged popula-
tions have higher COVID-19 infection rates and higher death 
rates than their more privileged counterparts, so unmiti-
gated epidemics could hit these populations hardest.15 16 
Overcrowded housing, heightened stress, chronic comor-
bidities and inability to socially distance are major drivers of 
COVID-19 infection and disease severity, and often unavoid-
able for those without adequate resources.17 It is also clear 
that the pandemic has exacerbated existing structural 
inequities where adequate economic support has not been 
available to lessen the blow of income loss for disadvantaged 
groups.18
In most settings where lockdown policies have been 
introduced, social protection interventions are integral 
to their implementation. As many countries are facing 
COVID-19- related declines in tax revenues and increasing 
demands on public spending, countries increasingly need 
better information to inform social protection policies in 
their response to the pandemic. This includes tools to 
help them rapidly assess where and how limited funds 
for social protection can be best mobilised, so that equity 
can be simultaneously considered alongside aggregate 
health and economic impact in the response to COVID-
19. While there are complex models to inform both 
potential health and macro- economic impact of policy 
responses to COVID-19, there are few tools available to 
rapidly assess potential equity impacts and social protec-
tion needs.19 Some existing models have helped decision 
makers in the USA20 and Uruguay21 to understand equity 
and poverty trade- offs of policies. However, these models 
are reliant on household- level census data, which is often 
absent in low- income and middle- income countries.
The aim of this work is to explore the potential to use 
globally available data in a policy- focused model to under-
stand the equity impact of lockdowns in various settings, 
in terms of risk of exposure to COVID-19 and income loss. 
We demonstrate a pragmatic approach to exploring ineq-
uity of COVID-19 policies alongside health impact and 
macro- economic modelling, comparing these risks across 
six countries in different income groups. We focus on 
inequities in socioeconomic status (SES) due to limited 
data availability, although there are also many other 
aspects of concern when considering equity—including 
structural discriminations pertaining to race, gender, 
place of residence and other forms of deprivation.
METHODS
Model structure and data sources
We created an economic model to illustrate and simu-
late the equity consequences of the initial stringent lock-
downs imposed to curb the spread of COVID-19 in six 
countries, including two lower- middle- income countries 
(the Philippines, Pakistan), two upper- middle- income 
countries (South Africa, Georgia) and two high- income 
countries (United Kingdom (UK), Chile).22 We chose 
these countries because they span a range of country 
income groups and workforce structures, and all coun-
tries introduced lockdown measures in March and April 
2020.1 Our assumptions defining ‘full lockdown’ in each 
country are detailed in online supplemental file 2; in 
each country, lockdowns involved restriction of non- 
essential movement, closure of non- essential businesses 
and schools and encouragement of teleworking where 
possible. In some countries, lockdowns also included 
introduction of curfews, but this was not included in our 
model.
Our conceptual basis for the model is illustrated in 
figure 1, adapted from Vassall et al.23 We consider ability 
and willingness to socially distance as factors of indi-
vidual perception of economic and health risk associated 
with COVID-19. Where individual perception of health 
risks from COVID-19 are high and economic risk is low, 
people will be highly willing to self- isolate. In contrast, 
where the economic risks associated with self- isolating are 
high compared with perceived health risks (eg, because 
isolating will result in food insecurity or other long- term 
effects), people will likely be less willing to self- isolate.
Where public policies enforce physical distancing 
through NPIs, these trade- offs are also driven by indi-
vidual employment status and the degree to which indus-
tries are impacted by NPIs. The economic risk of staying 
home is very low for those who can work remotely. If an 
individual is an essential worker, their ability to socially 
distance will be far lower without higher- stakes health/
economic trade- offs, such as leaving their job. Where 
industries are closed due to lockdown, those losing 
income may be forced to seek other means of survival if 
there is no social safety net available.
We consider the impact of lockdown on two dimen-
sions of individual economic risk. First, we estimate risk of 
economic hardship due to losing income during the lock-
down. Next, we estimate the number of people unable to 
socially distance due to economic concerns. We do not 
Figure 1 Model structure and assumptions.
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consider individual perceptions of health risk or willing-
ness to socially distance for reasons other than economic 
concerns, nor do we evaluate variations in access to sani-
tation measures to protect against COVID-19 infection. 
Our analysis is restricted to the first period of full lock-
down in each country before any scaling back of strin-
gency in each country and focuses only on people within 
the labour force (including employed and unemployed 
persons).
We first quantified the number of workers in each 
2- digit International Standard Classification of Occupa-
tions (ISCO) occupation code (ISCO-08) by country.24 
We used datasets on the total number of employees by 
occupation, and the total number of unemployed people 
by former occupation from the International Labour 
Organization (ILO).25 26 These data include all people 
of working age in paid employment or self- employment, 
including informal employment and employment in the 
informal sector. We do not consider people outside the 
labour force (including students, retirees, permanently 
disabled individuals, homemakers and discouraged job- 
seekers) as there is insufficient data on sources of income 
for these groups. Where the most recent data used older 
occupation codes (ISCO-88), these were reclassified into 
ISCO-08 codes using crosswalks provided by the ILO.27 
We used information on the distribution of each occu-
pation across 20 codes from the Statistical Classification 
of Economic Activities in the European Community 
representing economic activities, or industries, to cross- 
tabulate the total number of people in each occupation 
by industry.28 We used the most recent information avail-
able for each country, which was 2017 in Chile, 2018 
in Pakistan and 2019 in South Africa, the Philippines, 
Georgia and the UK. We did not adjust estimates from 
earlier years, assuming the broad structure of employ-
ment in the population would not change substantially 
between 2017 and 2020.
‘Essential’ jobs and teleworkable jobs
For each country, we used news searches, policy docu-
ments and previous research to identify the percentage 
of workers in each industry that would be identified as 
‘essential’ and allowed to work in- person as normal 
during lockdown.2–5 We assumed all ‘essential’ workers 
would continue working in- person and therefore would 
continue earning as normal but would be exposed to 
possible infection with SARS- CoV-2 during lockdown. 
The number of people in ‘essential’ industries varied 
by country, for example, in South Africa some workers 
in the mining sector were considered essential as public 
revenues depend significantly on this sector. In Chile, 
governmental designations of ‘essential’ industries 
were not enforceable, leading to many more companies 
continuing in- person operation.29
We next identified the percentage of workers in activ-
ities that were ‘subject to teleworking’, meaning people 
would be able to continue working if their job were tele-
workable, and otherwise would not be able to continue 
work. We evaluated the working status of those in ‘subject 
to teleworking’ activities using a ’teleworkability index’ 
constructed using data from two Occupational Network 
(O*NET) surveys conducted in the USA.30 The telework-
ability index was based on survey responses covering work 
context and work activities, for example, occupations 
requiring specialised tools or involving the operation 
of vehicles or equipment were assumed not to be tele-
workable. This index has been extrapolated and applied 
to a range of countries, assuming that the same factors 
would influence teleworkability in all countries.30–32 We 
compared the estimated number of ‘teleworkable’ jobs 
against the total number of internet users in each country 
to verify estimates.
‘Closed’ jobs, non-teleworkable jobs and unemployed people
We finally estimated the percentage of workers by occu-
pation in activities that were ‘closed’, or restricted from 
continuing economic activity during lockdown, such as 
the hospitality industry. We assumed people in ‘closed’ 
activities would not continue working during lockdown, 
even if their job were ‘teleworkable’, as activity in the 
industry would be largely halted during lockdown.
We estimated the total number of people out of work 
during lockdown as the sum of unemployed people, 
people in ‘closed’ activities and people who were in a job 
that was not ‘essential’ and not teleworkable. We assumed 
that a proportion of these people would have access to 
social protection which would replace their lost income 
and allow them to stay socially distanced during lock-
down. The coverage of social protection was estimated 
at 20% in the base case,33 and we assumed social protec-
tion was not targeted at any particular population or SES 
quintile. We further assumed that a portion of people 
losing income would have access to private emergency 
funds (eg, savings, loans or gifts from family/friends) to 
tide them over financially until lockdown ended in the 
absence of a social security umbrella or furlough scheme. 
We estimated access to emergency funds using data 
from the Global Findex Database.34 This global survey 
includes information on the percentage of survey respon-
dents reporting that in case of an emergency it would be 
possible for them to come up with 1/20 of gross national 
income (GNI) per capita in local currency within the next 
month. We input into our model the percentage of those 
in the labour force reporting access to emergency funds 
by SES quintile, for each country. We assumed those 
with no access to emergency funds and not receiving any 
social support would need to continue some economic 
activity to survive, even if this were illegal or unsafe, and 
therefore would not be able to socially distance during 
lockdown.
Outcomes by SES quintile
To summarise, using the above- listed assumptions and 
estimations, we identified two sets of non- mutually exclu-
sive binary outcomes:
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1. Income maintained versus income lost. ‘Essential' 
workers and people who were able to telework con-
tinued earning income as normal; people in ‘closed’ 
activities and people unable to telework faced a loss of 
income if they were unable to access social protection.
2. Able to socially distance versus not able to socially dis-
tance. People who were able to telework, and those 
out of work with access to emergency funds or social 
protection would be able to socially distance during 
lockdown. ‘Essential’ workers would not be able to 
socially distance during lockdown, and those with no 
access to emergency funds or social protection would 
find work even if this were unsafe or illegal. We did not 
consider any varying degrees of protection.
To evaluate socioeconomic inequalities in the above- 
listed outcomes, we generated country- specific SES 
quintiles. For each country, we ranked the labour force 
using International Socio- Economic Index (ISEI) scores 
as an indicator of SES by occupation,35 36 and then split 
the labour force into five equal quintiles. ISEI scores are 
identified by ISCO-08 occupation group, and range from 
10 (subsistence farmers) to 70 (science and engineering 
professionals). The process for development of the ISEI 
scores is described further by Ganzeboom et al.35 36 Where 
ISEI scores were tied between multiple occupations, we 
used the Standard International Occupational Prestige 
Scale37 to break the tie and help split the population into 
equal groups.
Estimates for each of the four outcomes listed above 
are presented by SES quintile for each country. We esti-
mated a concentration index, a measure of inequality that 
indicates the extent to which an outcome is concentrated 
among the advantaged or disadvantaged. The concen-
tration index represents twice the area between a line of 
equality (a 45- degree line) and the curve representing the 
cumulative proportion of people experiencing the given 
outcome, when the population is ranked by SES (the 
concentration curve).38 It is bounded between −1 and 1, 
where a value less than zero indicates that the outcome 
is concentrated in lower quintiles, and a concentration 
index above zero indicates that the outcome is concen-







 , where  o  is the outcome variable (ie, 
income loss or inability to socially distance during 
lockdown),  µ  is its mean and r  is the fractional rank in 
the distribution of SES.39 40 We used the Stata module 
‘concindc’ to calculate the concentration index and its 
SE for each outcome.41
Scenario analysis: social protection
Finally, we conducted a scenario analysis to evaluate the 
potential for social protection to mitigate the impact of 
income loss and improve ability to socially distance. We 
estimated the impact of providing social protection to 
20%, 50% and 80% of people losing income for each 
day the country spent in the most stringent tier during 
the first lockdowns.1 For each level of social protection 
coverage, we also estimated the average cost per person 
covered per day as equivalent to 1/365th of the 2020 GNI 
per capita for each person losing income due to lock-
down.42
Patient and public involvement
This analysis used only publicly available data from global 
data sources, in an effort to inform rapid modelling where 
primary data are lacking. As no data were collected for 
the purposes of this study, it was not relevant to involve 
patients or the public in the design, conduct, reporting, 
or dissemination plans of our research.
RESULTS
The makeup of the workforce varied in each country, 
however SES quintiles contained equal segments of the 
population by design (figure 2, panel A). The full details 
of employment by occupation for each country are 
provided in online supplemental table 2.
‘Essential’ and teleworkable jobs
The proportion of the labour force that was able to tele-
work during lockdown varied from 10% in the Philip-
pines to 21% in the UK (online supplemental table 1). 
The UK has a higher number of managers and profes-
sionals, and therefore a larger proportion of the work-
force can work from home. In contrast, Pakistan, the 
Philippines and South Africa have a larger number of 
workers in mining, construction, manufacturing and 
other elementary occupations, most of which are not 
conducive to working from home. People who were able 
to telework were largely concentrated in SES quintiles 4 
and 5 (figure 2, panel E).
The overall proportion of the labour force in ‘essential’ 
activities, who would continue earning as normal during 
lockdown but would not be able to socially distance, 
varied from 25% in Pakistan and South Africa to 52% in 
Chile (online supplemental table 3). In Chile, Pakistan 
and the Philippines, a large portion of ‘essential’ workers 
were in elementary occupations, while this was mostly 
health professionals and health associate professionals in 
Georgia and the UK. In Chile, Pakistan and the Philip-
pines, essential workers were more concentrated in lower 
SES quintiles, while in the UK and Georgia essential 
workers were more concentrated in higher SES quintiles 
(figure 2, panel C).
‘Closed’ and non-teleworkable jobs, and unemployed people
Overall, the proportion of the labour force that was 
unemployed, working in activities that were closed 
during lockdown or working in activities that were not 
teleworkable ranged from 31% in Chile to 64% in Paki-
stan (; figure 2, panels B, D, F). In all countries except 
South Africa, personal service workers and sales workers 
had the largest percentage of income losses; in South 
Africa, this was clerical support workers and cleaners and 
helpers online supplemental table 4.
Of those losing income due to lockdown, an average 
of 39% (ranging from 26% in South Africa to 62% in 
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the UK) would have access to emergency funds in the 
event of sudden income loss. The model assumes in the 
base case that a further 20% of people with income loss 
would receive some form of social assistance, while the 
remainder would need to resume some form of economic 
activity. In our base case estimates, an average of 52% of 
the labour force would be unable to socially distance 
during lockdown due to economic concerns (ranging 
from 40% in the UK to 67% in Chile).
Outcomes by quintile
Figure 3 summarises the number of people by quintile 
encountering our two key outcomes: loss of income and 
inability to socially distance during lockdown. Chile had 
the smallest percentage of people losing income during 
lockdown (25%), but the highest proportion of people 
unable to socially distance during lockdown (67%); 
this was a result of relatively more companies contin-
uing in- person operation as normal as governmental 
Figure 2 Economic impact of lockdown measures by socioeconomic status quintile.
Figure 3 Income loss and ability to socially distance during lockdown by country.
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designations of ‘closed’ industries were non- enforceable. 
The UK had the lowest percentage of people unable to 
socially distance during lockdown (40% of the labour 
force) because more occupations were ‘teleworkable’. 
In all four middle- income countries, high numbers of 
people experienced both income loss and inability to 
socially distance due to a lack of access to emergency 
funds. This was especially high in the lower income quin-
tiles. For most countries, only the highest SES quintile 
had a high number of people who were both earning 
as normal and protected from exposure to COVID-19 
during lockdown.
The potential impact of lockdown was regressive in all 
countries (figure 4; table 1). Disproportionately more 
people in lower SES quintiles were unable to socially 
distance during lockdown in all countries, and more 
experienced income loss during lockdown in all coun-
tries except Chile. Concentration indices for income 
loss were lowest in the UK (−0.24), while concentration 
indices for inability to socially distance were lowest in 
Chile (−0.19) and Pakistan (−0.13).
Scenario analysis: social protection
Figure 5 shows the results of our scenario analysis looking 
at the impact of changes in social protection. Our anal-
ysis shows that social protection is very important for miti-
gating both health and economic impacts of lockdown. 
Increasing the assumed availability of social protection 
from 20% to 80% reduced the overall percentage of 
people losing income from an average of 46% (25%–
56%) to 11% (6%–14%). It also increased the overall 
percentage of people able to socially distance from 48% 
(33%–60%) to 66% (44%–71%) (table 1).
Untargeted social protection had no impact on the 
concentration indices for income loss, although it 
reduced overall income loss across the population in the 
workforce. For all countries except Chile improved social 
protection reduced inequity in ability to socially distance. 
This was because lower SES quintiles had less access to 
emergency funds, and therefore more people in lower 
SES quintiles relied on social protection to enable them 
to socially distance when losing income. In Chile, rela-
tively large numbers of people continued in- person work 
as normal, so the group of people losing income in the 
base case was small.
Finally, our scenario analysis finds that the cost of 
achieving 20% social protection coverage would be 
equivalent to an average of 0.6% gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the base case (ranging from 0.1% in Pakistan to 
1.1% in Chile). On average across countries, increasing 
social protection from 20% to 80% coverage during the 
most stringent lockdown period would require increased 
government spending equivalent to 1.8% of 2020 GDP 
(moving from 0.6% to 2.4% of GDP on average).
DISCUSSION
Our analysis provides an example of a rapid, illustrative 
approach using global datasets to inform implementa-
tion of NPIs and corresponding social protection inter-
ventions, across settings. A static economic model such as 
the one presented cannot reflect the dynamic reality or 
complexity of changing economies during the COVID-19 
pandemic. However, it can highlight areas of concern 
where further investigation and policy consideration is 
needed, in the absence of being to stratify more complex 
Figure 4 Concentration curves—socioeconomic inequalities in economic and health risk.
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epidemiological and economic outcomes by socio- 
economic group.
We find that the stringent lockdowns seen in the early 
response to the pandemic are likely to have had a signifi-
cant impact on equity in all settings. The overall numbers 
of people losing income and/or unable to socially 
distance in the absence of social protection were high 
in all countries. Lower SES quintiles were consistently 
put at both greater health and/or economic risk during 
lockdown. Even where more equitable distributionally, 
the absolute impact of widespread loss of income may be 
catastrophic, especially in countries where incomes are 
lower to start with.
Overall, our estimated cost for social protection inter-
ventions to mitigate the impact of lockdown was rela-
tively low in all settings when compared with the costs 
of an unmitigated COVID-19 epidemic. Providing the 
equivalent GNI per capita per day for each person losing 
income would require an average of 2% of GDP. In 
comparison, OECD countries usually spend an average 
of 19.8% GDP on social protection every year (ranging 
from 7% in Mexico to 31% in France).43 Paying people 
to stay home may therefore be a reasonable policy option 
when compared with the estimated costs of treating an 
unmitigated COVID-19 epidemic, which has been esti-
mated as 8.72%–216.36% of current health spending 
globally, or 0.86%–10.88% GDP,44 excluding the intrinsic 
value of avoided morbidity and mortality.
We find that improved access to social protection can 
reduce both economic and health impact of stringent 
lockdowns. Our estimates of the cost of replacing lost 
income are approximately in line with what is known 
about the costs of the furlough scheme in the UK.45 
However, without good data on the actual breadth and 
reach of social protection interventions in all settings, 
it is difficult to draw conclusions on the actual impact 
that social protection schemes had on outcomes in each 
country. While we estimated 20% access to social protec-
tion in the base case, changes in this assumption had 
substantial resulting changes in our outcome estimates. 
The ability of the model to inform implementation and 
targeting of social protection could be improved if better 
data on the accessibility and uptake of these schemes 
were available.
The affordability of social protection measures may, 
however, also change over time. The model uses simple 
assumptions intending to be illustrative and does not 
consider the complex timelines of varying stringency in 
Table 1 Outcomes, concentration indices and costs of social protection programmes
Social protection 
coverage
People losing income People unable to socially distance Total projected cost 
of social protection 
programmes (billions) 
(% GDP)








20% coverage (base case)
  Chile 1.6M (24.6%) 0.02 (0.06) 4.6M (70.2%) −0.19 (0.05) 5.06 (1.1%)
  Georgia 0.3M (37.0%) −0.12 (0.03) 0.5M (59.3%) −0.11 (0.04) 0.37 (0.6%)
  Pakistan 13.2M (50.9%) −0.09 (0.09) 15.6M (60.0%) −0.13 (0.03) 1.07 (0.1%)
  Philippines 13.8M (49.3%) −0.09 (0.09) 17.8M (63.6%) −0.10 (0.02) 7.03 (0.7%)
  South Africa 7.9M (49.1%) −0.15 (0.06) 10.4M (64.8%) −0.10 (0.03) 2.40 (0.3%)
  UK 11.2M (39.9%) −0.24 (0.06) 12.5M (44.7%) −0.02 (0.06) 25.28 (0.8%)
50% coverage
  Chile 1.0M (15.4%) 0.02 (0.06) 4.1M (63.6%) −0.19 (0.05) 12.64 (2.7%)
  Georgia 0.2M (23.1%) −0.12 (0.03) 0.5M (50.7%) −0.07 (0.03) 0.92 (1.6%)
  Pakistan 8.3M (31.8%) −0.09 (0.09) 12.2M (46.8%) −0.11 (0.02) 2.68 (0.3%)
  Philippines 8.6M (30.8%) −0.09 (0.09) 14.1M (50.4%) −0.08 (0.04) 17.58 (1.8%)
  South Africa 4.9M (30.7%) −0.15 (0.06) 8.0M (50.2%) −0.07 (0.03) 5.99 (0.8%)
  UK 7.0M (25.0%) −0.24 (0.06) 10.9M (39.0%) 0.03 (0.05) 63.19 (1.9%)
80% coverage
  Chile 0.4M (6.2%) 0.02 (0.06) 3.7M (56.9%) −0.20 (0.05) 20.22 (4.2%)
  Georgia 0.1M (9.2%) −0.12 (0.03) 0.4M (42.1%) 0.01 (0.02) 1.47 (2.5%)
  Pakistan 3.3M (12.7%) −0.09 (0.09) 8.8M (33.7%) −0.09 (0.04) 4.29 (0.4%)
  Philippines 3.5M (12.3%) −0.09 (0.09) 10.4M (37.1%) −0.05 (0.08) 28.12 (2.8%)
  South Africa 2.0M (12.3%) −0.15 (0.06) 5.7M (35.7%) −0.01 (0.04) 9.58 (1.3%)
  UK 2.8M (10.0%) −0.24 (0.06) 9.3M (33.2%) 0.09 (0.05) 101.11 (3.1%)
GDP, gross domestic product; M, million; SE, standard error.
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movement restrictions and other NPIs over time. Our 
estimates also reflected only the first full period of lock-
down in each country. Depending on lockdown duration 
and access to social protection, the impact and costs of 
social protection schemes might be higher. For example, 
in settings such as Chile, where the period of partial lock-
down was relatively long, the costs of covering reduced 
incomes for this entire period may be much higher. 
Further analysis is needed to understand the current 
coverage of social protection schemes, and the impact of 
length of lockdown on social protection effectiveness and 
cost.
Our analysis also assumes that social protection inter-
ventions are untargeted, with equal coverage across all 
SES quintiles. Due to a lack of appropriate data, our 
model could not account for the complexity of social 
protection responses to COVID-19 in the analysed coun-
tries, which included a wide range of policies such as 
targeted and untargeted transfer schemes, improvement 
of employment protection, increased access to unemploy-
ment benefits or health insurance schemes and changes 
to banking regulations.46 Improved systematic data on 
eligibility and access to social protection schemes could 
improve analyses like this in future.
Targeted social protection may further improve equity 
and reduce the costs of covering lost income. Countries 
considering targeting of social protection in response to 
COVID-19 should consider carefully where populations 
with different kinds of risk need different types of inter-
ventions to manage the economic and health impacts 
of lockdowns. Our analysis shows that people in SES 
quintiles 2–3 experience disproportionate income loss 
and will likely need income support. In some countries, 
SES quintile 1 had more essential workers, and there-
fore fewer people losing income than quintiles 2 and 
3. These people may have less need for replacement of 
income loss, but more need for other kinds of support 
to manage their risk of COVID-19 exposure. This could 
include measures such as provision of personal protec-
tive equipment and sanitation facilities, safer transport 
options, shielding policies to protect the most vulnerable 
or workplace adaptations to allow proper distancing, for 
example, by operating at reduced capacity.
This analysis also does not include people outside the 
labour force and does not consider outcomes at the house-
hold level. The makeup of households varies consider-
ably across countries; and there may be increased need 
for social protection schemes untied to employment in 
countries where a large proportion of the population is 
outside the labour force.
This analysis focuses on workplace closures and does 
not consider some other important aspects of health 
and economic risk during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
We assume all employees receive full earnings if they 
are ‘essential’ or ‘teleworking’. We do not include the 
productivity loss associated with ill health, nor do we 
consider inequality of access to paid sick leave, which is 
likely to have a substantial impact. We also do not consider 
productivity impact of caring responsibilities, which 
is most likely substantial where schools are closed.47 In 
many settings, the burden of caring responsibilities falls 
disproportionately on women, and so further investiga-
tion into the impact of COVID-19 on gender equity is 
also important.48
Figure 5 Scenario analysis.
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These estimates could be applied to an epidemiolog-
ical model linked to an economic impact model to help 
understand the differential infection rates across SES 
quintiles, and trade- offs between aggregate impact and 
the distribution of impact. Some further adjustment 
would be required for this application. For example, we 
do not consider any differential in exposure for those 
who are working outside the home, although certain 
occupations would likely have higher risk of infection. 
We also do not consider personal compliance with ‘stay at 
home’ orders stemming from other factors, such as trust 
in institutions or personal risk aversion.
In many countries, changes in the workforce and 
consumer behaviour have caused substantial macro- 
economic changes. Consumer demand has changed due 
to a combination of NPIs, reduced disposable income 
and individual choice to limit COVID-19 exposure. 
Changes in private consumption will affect employ-
ment even if there is no official lockdown, for example, 
through reduced demand leading to business failures 
and unemployment. Deaths and illness due to COVID-19 
have also caused reductions in available labour, and there 
is evidence that many people have chosen to take early 
retirement or otherwise leave the workforce.49 As such, 
some of the income loss that we attribute to lockdown 
policies may have occurred anyway given wider changes 
in the macro- economy.
Our analysis should be taken as indicative of potential 
policy implications rather than as definitive evidence of 
outcomes for the countries included. We used globally 
available summary data on the workforce in each country 
and used occupation as a proxy indicator for SES. These 
limitations highlight an urgent need for more country- 
level data on the impact of non- pharmaceutical inter-
ventions on economic and/or health risk. Where such 
country- level data are available, our results are in line with 
existing estimates. In Chile and Italy, recent analysis has 
found that people with lower SES were less able to socially 
distance during lockdown, while in the UK and Germany 
lower SES groups were more exposed to COVID- induced 
financial hardship.28 50–52 Although there is evidence of 
inequitable social and economic impacts of COVID-19 
in several low- income and middle- income countries, 
loss of income and ability to socially distance are largely 
not quantified across income quintiles, making it chal-
lenging for policy makers in low- income and middle- 
income countries to explicitly evaluate trade- offs in their 
planning and decision- making.53–55 National surveys on 
changes in income, access to social protection, ability 
and willingness to socially distance would improve the 
research informing policy in these countries.
CONCLUSION
Non- pharmaceutical interventions including national 
lockdowns have been used by many countries to miti-
gate the detrimental health and economic effects 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has fallen most 
heavily on the poor. These lockdown measures have 
necessarily been accompanied by social protection 
measures. Evaluating these measures in advance has 
relied on epidemiological and economic models, 
most of which are not able to evaluate distributional 
as well as aggregate impact, the absence of which may 
lead to a lack of consideration of inequities. Our anal-
ysis demonstrates a method that uses globally avail-
able data to inform policy makers on where economic 
risks associated with lockdown may be most critical, 
and where social protection can be most effectively 
introduced. Where social protection is unavailable, 
our work suggests that national lockdowns are likely 
to be regressive both in their impact on loss of income 
and in their impact on risk of exposure to COVID-19, 
across a range of different country settings. But data 
on the resulting inequity takes time to emerge.
There is substantial policy debate in many coun-
tries focusing on the trade- offs between health risk 
and economic risk with NPIs. Our analysis shows 
that different sections of the population experience 
these trade- offs differently, and in many cases these 
two risks are overlapping. Our results underscore the 
importance of removing barriers to access to less strin-
gent measures such as improved access to testing and 
tracing, isolation and targeted screening, improved 
resources for shielding and vaccination. Although 
not replacements for broader population- level social 
distancing measures, these measures may help to limit 
the need for stringent lockdowns by slowing spread of 
COVID-19 without impacting individual incomes and 
can improve equity. Where more stringent measures 
are needed when COVID-19 infection rates are high, 
robust socioeconomic support will likely be needed to 
offset losses in income and enable people to socially 
distance.
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